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I
INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1985, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
published requests for public comment on two companion "concept
releases," more commonly known as "trial balloons," concerning the
internationalization of securities markets. The first release,' promulgated
pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933,2 sought comments on two alternative
prospectus approaches to facilitate multinational securities offerings: the
"reciprocal approach" and the "common prospectus" approach. 3 The
second release, 4 promulgated pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 5 sought comments on various issues arising from the increased
internationalization of the secondary securities markets.
In discussing the Canadian perspective on multinational securities
offerings, this article focuses more on the SEC's 1933 Act Release than the
1934 Act Release. Certain areas regulated by the 1934 Act and discussed
extensively in the 1934 Act Release, such as the consolidation reports of
trading volume and prices among various geographically dispersed trading
markets, are beyond the scope of this article. These areas are highly technical
and do not directly affect the securities issuer. However, those aspects of the
1934 Act which affect primary distributions, such as continuous reporting
requirements, will be discussed.
The subject of internationalization of the primary issue securities markets
has probably become more topical recently for Canadians as a result of the
great liberalization by the government of Ontario of the rules respecting
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1. Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, Request for Public Comment, Securities
Act Release No. 33-6568, 50 Fed. Reg. 9,281 (Mar. 7, 1985) [hereinafter 1933 Act Release].
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982).
3. See infra notes 64 & 65 and accompanying text for an explanation of the SEC's two
approaches.
4. Request for Comments on Issues Concerning Internationalization of the World Securities
Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 34-21958, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,302 (Apr. 25, 1985) [hereinafter 1934
Act Release].
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982).
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foreign ownership of securities dealers. 6 While the ownership of dealers is

obviously a topic distinct from prospectus requirements, it would not be
surprising if eventually greater internationalization in the former area
contributed to the same phenomenon in the latter.
II
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SECURITIES MARKETS

The statistics on the internationalization of securities markets are
impressive. It is estimated that in 1985 there were 328 corporations with an
active international market-meaning at least one liquid market outside the
home country-for their equity securities. 7 United States private issuers
offered $3.5 billion (U.S.) in debt securities in the Eurobond market during
the first nine months of 1986.8 In secondary trading markets, transactions by
foreign investors in U.S. equities had a value in the first half of 1986 of
approximately $131 billion (U.S.) and transactions in foreign equities by U.S.
investors during the same period had a value of approximately $45 billion
(U.S.). 9 At the beginning of 1984, there were forty-six foreign securities or
American Depository Receipts listed on the New York Stock Exchange, fiftytwo on the American Stock Exchange (accounting for 12.8% by value of the
transactions on the AMEX in that year), and 294 quoted on NASDAQ.O
The statistics on the internationalization of the Canadian securities
markets, although naturally much smaller in absolute terms, are also
impressive. During the first half of 1985, 26% by value of the total new issues
of debt securities by Canadian governmental and private issuers, or $4.9
billion (U.S.) worth of debt, was issued outside of North America. t ' The
Canadian share of the Eurobond market is believed to be over 10%.12
Between 7% and 10% of new equity issues by Canadian companies are placed
outside Canada on an annual basis. 13 As early as 1984, the dollar value of
trades in securities interlisted among The Toronto Exchange, other Canadian
6. Regulation to Amend Regulation 910 of Revised Regulations of Ontario, 1980 (June 17,
1987). As a result of the revisions, non-Canadians are permitted, as ofJune 30, 1987, to own up to
50% of the voting and participating securities of a securities dealer licensed in Ontario, and
restrictions on foreign ownership will be removed completely on June 20, 1988. For a description of
the formerly, extremely restrictive rules governing foreign ownership of securities dealers, see
Connelly, The Licensing of Securities Market Actors, in 3 PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES MARKET LAW FOR
CANADA 1265, 1385-92 (P. Anisman ed. 1979).
7. Response of The Toronto Stock Exchange to Request for Comments on Issues Concerning
Internationalization of the World Securities Markets, S.E.C. File No. 37-16-85, at 4 n.3 (July 7, 1985)
[hereinafter TSE Response to 1934 Act Release].
8. Finance Officers' Wider Role, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1986, at 23, col. 3.

9.

Ketchum, Internationalizationof the Securities Markets, in

INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS

13 (Practicing Law Institute 1987).
10. 1934 Act Release, supra note 4, at 16,303.
11. Submission of the Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission to the Securities and
Exchange Commission Concerning the Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, S.E.C.
Release No. 33-6568, at 1-222 (Oct. 4, 1985), reprinted in 8 ONT. SEC. COMMISSION BULL. 3972, 3977
(1985) [hereinafter OSC Response to 1933 Act Release].
12. TSE Response to 1933 Act Release, supra note 7, at 2 n.2.
13. Id.
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exchanges, and U.S. exchanges was $25.2 billion.' 4 In that year, some seventy
Canadian equities were traded on one or more American exchanges or quoted
on NASDAQ and twenty-three were traded on the London Stock Exchange.15
The recent establishment of computer assisted trading links between The
Toronto Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange and between the
Montreal Exchange and the Boston Stock Exchange has facilitated increased
trading between the United States and Canada.
This growing
internationalization of the two countries' securities markets will present
increasing regulatory concerns.
Although there have been some very large multinational offerings by
Canadian issuers,' 6 the chief impetus for the SEC's 1933 Act Release may
have been the spate of privatizations carried out by the Government in the
United Kingdom. A striking example is the initial public offering by British
Telecommunications plc in 1984 which was then the largest initial public
offering ever made.

17

The 1933 Act Release focused on integration of the primary issue market
with the United Kingdom and Canada because of the large number of issuers
from these countries accessing the U.S. market and the similarity of disclosure
requirements among the three countries.' 8 Nonetheless, the problems in
coordinating a simultaneous offering in Canada, the United States, and the
United Kingdom are far greater than within North America alone. Although
the systems for bringing new issues to market in Canada and the United States
are nearly identical, the system in the United Kingdom is very different from
the North American standard. For example. in the United Kingdom there is
no preliminary prospectus, the equivalent of a pricing date is set weeks or
months in advance, and there is, as a practical matter, no last minute ability to
alter the prospectus offering price. 19 Additionally, in the United Kingdom,
substantial publicity-indeed advertising-is undertaken before the
prospectus is published in the newspaper. Moreover, the regulation of new
issues is undertaken by the London Stock Exchange in the case of listed
companies and otherwise by the Registrar of Companies, rather than by a
securities commission. 20 Finally, the underwriters are prohibited from
stabilizing the after-market. This prohibition exposes the North American
14. Id. at 2.
15. Id. at 2 n.2.
16. For example, the 1983 multinational offerings by Bell Canada Enterprises and Alcan
Aluminum Limited were qualified for sale in the United States. See Letter from Marc J. Ryan to
Michael Melanson (July 5, 1985).
17. The British Telecommunications public offering raised $269,118,000 (U.S.). See Prospectus
for British Telecommunications (Dec. 3, 1984).
18. 1933 Act Release, supra note 1, at 9,281.
19. Id. at 9,282-83.
20. This remains the case even after the effectiveness of the Financial Services Bill in the United
Kingdom on October 27, 1986. The Financial Services Bill has entrusted the regulation of persons
in the securities business, but not securities issuers (other than mutual funds), to the Securities and
Investments Board, a supervisory body financed and staffed by the private sector. See Pimlot, The
Reform of Investor Protection in the U.K.-An Examination of the Proposals of the Gower Report and the U'. K.
Government's White Paper ofJanuary, 1985, 7 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 141, 161-62 (1985).
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underwriters in an offering by a British corporation to the risk that British
speculators will regard foreign stabilization practices as in effect supplying a
downside guarantee during the distribution.
In recognition of the
fundamental disparities between the primary offering regimes of either of the
North American countries, on the one hand, and that of the United Kingdom,
on the other, this article focuses primarily on the interrelationship between
the Canadian and U.S. securities markets.
III
CURRENT UNITED STATES TREATMENT OF FOREIGN ISSUERS

For a multinational securities offering possibly to warrant treatment
different from any nation's domestic prospectus requirements, it must be an
offering made simultaneously in two or more jurisdictions and not simply an
offering within a single jurisdiction by a foreign issuer. Assuming a public
interest in facilitating the internationalization of primary securities markets, it
is hard to imagine any compelling reason why foreign issuers cannot be
expected to comply strictly with the host jurisdiction's securities laws.
Nevertheless, the SEC has eased the way for foreign issuers by the
promulgation in 1982 of Forms F-1, F-2, and F-3. 2 1 As compared with the
correspondingly numbered "S-" forms, the "F-" forms offer three
advantages to foreign "private issuers" seeking to register offerings under the
1933 Act. 22 First, financial statements may be prepared in accordance with "a
comprehensive body of accounting principles other than those generally
accepted in the United States," although a discussion and quantification of the
material deviations from U.S. GAAP must be provided. 2 3
Second,
remuneration paid by the issuer to its officers and directors may in most cases
be disclosed on an aggregate, rather than an individual, basis and the amount
of disclosure regarding certain transactions in which management has a
pecuniary interest has also been limited. 2 4 Third, financial statements for
foreign private issuers do not have to be quite as current as for U.S. domestic
issuers. 2 5 The accommodations to foreign issuers represented by the "F"
forms for 1933 Act registration are an extension of an accommodation made
21. Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 336437, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,764 (Dec. 6, 1982). The forms are reprinted at 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
6,951-75 (Dec. 4, 1982).
22. The term "foreign private issuer" is defined in Rule 405 under the 1933 Act, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.405 (1986), as a foreign nongovernmental issuer other than one meeting both of the following
conditions: (1) more than 50% of its outstanding voting securities are held by residents of the
United States; and (2)(a) the majority of the issuer's executive officers or directors are United States
citizens or residents, (b) more than 50% of the issuer's assets are in the United States, or (c) the
issuer's business is administered principally in the United States.
23. See SEC Regulation S-X Rule 4-01(a), 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a) (1986). Rule 4-01(a) requires
a reconciliation to United States accounting principles according to the provisions of Securities and
Exchange Commission Form 20-F, Item 18. Id.
24. See Form 20-F, General Instructions, Items 11 and 13, reprinted in 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
29,721 (Dec. 31, 1983) [hereinafter Form 20-F].
25. See SEC Rule 3-19, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-19 (1986).
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in 1979 by the introduction under the 1934 Act of Form 20-F for registration
26
and annual reports.
Foreign issuers who qualify to use the "F" forms confront less onerous
obligations in terms of the form itself and also face a lighter regulatory
burden than U.S. domestic (and certain Canadian) issuers who must use the
Form 10-K under the 1934 Act and the "S" forms under the 1933 Act.
Issuers using the "F" forms are not required to comply with SEC proxy and
insider reporting rules and do not have to make quarterly reports. 2 7
Furthermore, their insiders are not subject to the infamous section 16(b) of
the 1934 Act, requiring disgorgement of "short-swing" securities trading
28
profits.
Some Canadian issuers, however, are not entitled to use the "F" forms.
Canadian issuers who either have a class of securities listed on an exchange in
the United States or have filed a registration statement under the 1933 Act
must, like their U.S. domestic counterparts, use the Form 10-K and the "S"
forms.2 9 Nonetheless, all Canadian private issuers, without regard to their

entitlement to use the "F" forms, are permitted to file financial statements
prepared in accordance with accounting principles generally recognized in
Canada. 30 Furthermore, Canadian issuers, unlike other non-U.S. issuers,
qualify for the small offering exemption under Regulation A 3' and are
permitted to use the simplified disclosure system of Form S-18 for small
offerings.3 2 Hence, even without further reform, current SEC regulations
provide substantial accommodations to Canadian issuers.
IV
FOREIGN ISSUERS IN THE CANADIAN DOMESTIC MARKET

A.

Economic Disincentives

Several factors render Canadian securities markets less attractive to U.S.
issuers (other than mutual funds, whose securities were excluded from the
purview of the 1933 Act Release) than the U.S. securities markets are to
Canadian issuers. In comparison to the U.S. market, the Canadian market is
quite small. Canadian interest rates have consistently exceeded U.S. interest
rates for the last ten years, a result in large part of the Canadian government's
efforts to support the Canadian dollar. The Canadian income tax system is
strongly biased in favor of investments in Canadian, as opposed to foreign,
securities. For example, Canadian tax-exempt pension plans and registered
26.

Form 20-F was adopted in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16371, 44 Fed. Reg.

70,132 (Dec. 6, 1979).
27.
28.

See SEC Rules 3a12-3(b) & 13a-13, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.3a12-3(b) & 240.13a-13(b)(2) (1986).
See SEC Rule 3a12-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (1986).

29. Form 20-F, supra note 24, at 29,721 (Instruction A).
30. See SEC Regulation S-X, Rule 4-01(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. 210.4-01(a)(2) (1986).
31. See SEC Rule 252, 17 C.F.R. 230.252 (1986).
32. See Form S-18, Instruction 1. The form is reprinted at 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
(Jan. 20, 1987).
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retirement savings plans are subject to a penalty tax of 1% per month if they
have more than 10% of their portfolios in non-Canadian securities. s3
Registered retirement savings plans constitute a high proportion of individual
savings by Canadians and a large portion of all investments in equities by
individual Canadians are for the accounts of their registered retirement
savings plans. 34 Finally, the effective tax rate on dividends is lower for
dividends received from Canadian companies than for dividends received
35
from non-Canadian companies.
Non-Canadian issuers proposing to distribute securities within Canada will
encounter two important distinctions between the Canadian and U.S.
securities regulation schemes. First, securities regulation in Canada is a
matter of provincial and not federal responsibility. This distinction
constitutes an obstacle, though not insuperable, to Canadian participation in
multinational securities offerings. Second, in Ontario, Nova Scotia, Quebec,
Alberta, and British Columbia there is a "closed system" of statutory
prospectus exemptions and resale rules modeled after Professor Loss's
proposals in the American Law Institute Federal Securities Code. 3 6 Because,
however, the provincial systems provide administrators with broad exemptive
powers, this second distinction presents something of an opportunity.
B.

A System of Provincial Regulation

To an extent not yet judicially settled, the Canadian system of provincial
securities regulation is constitutionally mandated.
The Canadian
Constitution reserves to the respective provinces the exclusive power to
legislate in relation to "Property and Civil Rights in the Province." 3 7
Moreover, the federal power to make laws governing "The Regulation of
Trade and Commerce 38 has not been interpreted as broadly as the
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. 39 The drafters of The British
North America Act of 186740 sought to draft a charter for a strong federal
government that would avoid the dangers of excessive local hegemony
demonstrated with cataclysmic effect by the Civil War in the United States. By
virtue of judicial interpretation and such historical "imperatives" as the need
to preserve Quebec's French heritage, the Canadian provinces have emerged
33. Income Tax Act, ch. 63, 1970-1972 Can. Stat.§ 206, as amended.
34. In addition, individuals may deduct in computing their taxable income up to $1,000 of
Canadian-source interest and dividends received from Canadian corporations, Income Tax Act,
§ 110.1, but this deduction is scheduled for elimination in 1988 and later years. See Minister of
Finance, White Paper on Tax Reform (June 18, 1987), reprinted as Special Report iVo. 797, Can. Tax
Rep. (CCH) 170 (1987).
35. Income Tax Act, ch. 63, 1970-1972 Can. Stat. §§ 82(1), 121, as amended.
36. Federal Securities Code §§ 301-304 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1977).
37. Constitution Act, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3, § 92(13) (1867).
38. Id. § 91(2).

39.

See P.

HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA

87 n.29 (2d ed. 1985).

40. The British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3, § 91 (1867), continues to be the
Canadian Constitution insofar as division of powers is concerned.
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much more powerful in relation to the federal government than have the
states of the United States.
Although in the late 1970's there, appeared a good chance that a federal
scheme of securities regulation might be developed in Canada, 4 1 at present
the prospects for federal regulation seem remote. Even if constitutional
problems could. be resolved, 4 2 the provincial securities commissions are
solidly entrenched and some degree of provincial regulation would remain
under a system of federal securities regulation. 43 Canadians are not likely to
favor a federal system that would merely constitute another layer of
regulation super-imposed on the existing system rather than a truly national
system for prospectus clearance and uniform continuous disclosure. In
addition, the predominance of Toronto as the financial center of the country
militates against the development of a system of federal regulation. 4 4
Securities dealers, underwriters, and lawyers, as well as The Toronto Stock
Exchange, appear to have developed a satisfactory working relationship with
the Ontario Securities Commission. Transmutation of the Ontario Securities
Commission into the Canadian Securities Commission is likely to be
politically unacceptable. Therefore all concerned parties can be expected to
resist change and, barring an event that would demonstrate a clear need for
federal regulation, Canada will likely continue with its awkward yet workable
system of provincial regulation of a national marketplace. 4 5 To the extent
that the securities markets are becoming internationalized, Canada's
provincial regulatory system complicates, but is not fatal to, her participation.
41.

See generally 1-3

DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER

AND

CORPORATE AFFAIRS,

PROPOSALS

FOR A

SECURITIES MARKET LAW FOR CANADA (P. Anisman ed. 1979) [hereinafter PROPOSALS].

42. In recent years, the Supreme Court of Canada has occasionally demonstrated a more
hospitable attitude toward a federal regulatory power than in the past. See. e.g., Attorney Gen. of
Can. v. Canadian Nat'l Transp., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206, 207-09; Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon,
[1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, 173 (dictum of Dickson, J. relating specifically to possible national securities
legislation); In re Agricultural Prod. Mktg. Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198, 1201-02; Caloil, Inc. v. Attorney
Gen. of Can., [1971] 1 S.C.R. 543, 550-52. But see Labatt Breweries, Ltd. v. Attorney Gen. of Can.,
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 914, 915-16; Domion Stores, Ltd. v. The Queen, [1980] 1 5C.R. 844, 845.
43. See, e.g., Howard, Securities Regulation: Structure and Process, in 3 PROPOSALS. supra note 41, at
1607; Anisman, The Regulation of the Securities Market and the Harmonization of Provincial Laws, in
HARMONIZATION OF BUSINESS LAW IN CANADA 77 (R. Cuming ed. 1985) [hereinafter Anisman].

44. The status of Toronto as the predominant financial center is not lightly conceded by
.Montreal. In the summer of 1986, a proposal, apparently backed by the Canadian Federal
Government, emerged to make Montreal and Vancouver tax free zones for certain types of
international financial transactions but the proposal appears now to be dead. Globe and Mail, Aug.
30, 1986, at BI, cols. 4-5; Globe and Mail, July 6, 1987, at A13, col. 6.
45. To cite but one example of the differences, only five of the provinces (but including the four
most populous ones) have the "closed system" of exemptions and resale rules. These are Ontario,
Nova Scotia, Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia. See Securities Act, 8 ONT. REV. STAT., ch. 466,
§ (1)11 (1980) (definition of "distribution"); Securities Act, ch. 11, 1984 N.S. Stat. § 1(k) (definition
of "distribution"); Securities Act, ch. 48, 1982, Que. Stat. § 5 (definition of "distribution");
Securities Act, ch. S-6.1, 1981 Alta. Stat. § 1 (f)(definition of "distribution"); Securities Act, ch. 42,
1987 B.C. Star. § 1(1) (definition of "distribution"). The other five provinces use the familiar litany
of prospectus exemptions which require judicial examination of investment intent to determine
whether a distribution has been made to the public. This practice permits extensive leakage of
unregistered securities into the public marketplace.
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International market participants can adjust to the provincial regulatory
system as national ones have done.
C.

Provincial Cooperation

Although each of the ten Canadian provinces has its own legislation
regulating the distribution of securities within its boundaries, in reality, the
provincial regulatory system is not as unworkable as first appears. There is
substantial cooperation among the securities administrators of the various
provinces and there is a considerable tendency in matters of administration,
and even legislation, to let Ontario take the lead. Despite the reluctance of
Quebec and, increasingly, Alberta to defer to Ontario's lead, Canada has a
workable system for coordinated prospectus clearance among the provinces.
The securities administrators of all of the provinces have promulgated a
series of policies known as "National Policies." 4 6 Pursuant to National Policy
No. 1, an issuer files an identical preliminary prospectus simultaneously in all
of the provinces where the issuer desires to qualify the securities for sale. The
issuer names a principal jurisdiction (usually Ontario), and that jurisdiction
undertakes to send a first comment letter within ten business days of receipt
of the preliminary prospectus and a second comment letter within a further
five days. The first comment letter consists of the comments of the principal
jurisdiction and the second letter consists of the comments of the remaining
jurisdictions. It is rare for provinces other than Ontario, Quebec, Alberta,
and British Columbia to comment on prospectuses. Generally, the issuer and
its advisors deal only with the principal jurisdiction, which gathers comments
from and circulates responses to the remaining jurisdictions. If a point
between the issuer and one of the secondary jurisdictions proves difficult to
resolve, the issuer will seek the permission of the primary jurisdiction to deal
directly with the particular secondary jurisdiction. Where the principal
jurisdiction is Ontario, a need to deal directly with a secondary jurisdiction
would generally arise, if at all, only in the cases of Quebec and, to a lesser
extent, Alberta.
To be qualified in Quebec, a prospectus must be in the French language,
and the French version will be the official version for all Quebec purposes. So
long as there exists a French language version, an English language version of
the prospectus may be distributed in the province as well. 4 7

Because

translation represents a considerable additional cost, some issuers have
attempted to forego Quebec qualification of their offerings and to sell in
Quebec through prospectus exemptions simultaneously with the prospectus
offering elsewhere in Canada. Not surprisingly, the Quebec Securities
46. The National Policies are reprinted at 3 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 470-001 (1987).
47. The French language version is the official version and it is probable that if there is a
material misstatement in the English language version not present in the French language version, a
purchaser in Quebec who was misled by the English language version would not be able to avail
himself of the statutory remedies for a false prospectus. Securities Act, ch. 48, 1982 Que. Stat.
§ 40.1; Charter of the French Language, QUE. REV. STAT., ch. C-I I (1977).
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Commission looks with disfavor upon this practice and has threatened denial
of prospectus exemptions to issuers and disciplinary proceedings against
securities dealers who are parties to it.48
Opinions differ on the degree to which National Policy No. 1 has
accelerated the prospectus clearance process. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that prospectuses do not require an unduly long period to go from
preliminary to final on a nationwide basis. Most long form prospectuses
require five to six weeks; short form prospectuses normally require a week to
ten days.
D.

Hospitable Exemptions

The broad exemptive powers possessed by the provincial securities
administrators have enabled meaningful accomodations to be reached with
Accommodations by provincial
foreign issuers and underwriters.
administrators have included: exemptions to prospectus requirements;
waivers of the normal requirement that a private placement offering
memorandum include contractual rights of action analogous to the civil
liability provisions governing prospectus; and generous administrative
interpretations which exempt some foreign issuers from the literal
requirements of the statutory closed system.
Recently, numerous European companies have made multinational
49
offerings of securities in Canada by resorting to prospectus exemptions.
Among the most important of the transaction-based prospectus exemptions
are those available where the purchaser is either (1) a financial institution,
(2) an institution designated by the securities commissions as an "exempt
purchaser," or (3) an individual or institution which purchases as principal
where the securities have an acquisition cost of not less than $150,000.50

Although these transaction-based exemptions have enabled the Canadian
portions of certain multinational offerings to be placed without a Canadian
prospectus being qualified, the Canadian underwriters have used the
European prospectus as a selling document in Canada. Generally, the
regulations governing sales of securities without a prospectus require that if
an offering memorandum describing the issuer's business and affairs is used
in a private placement, the offering memorandum must describe rights of
action in favor of purchasers similar to those that would exist in a distribution
by means of a prospectus. Such rights must then be granted to the purchasers
by way of the subscription agreement. Therefore, if the offering

48. See Anisman, supra note 43, at 105.
49. Shares of Britoil, Cable and Wireless, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, and Swiss Bank
Corporation, among others, have been distributed in Canada in this way.
50. Securities Act, 8 ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 466, § 71(l)(a), (c), (d) (1980). Private placements to
exempt institutions, unlike to individuals, are not subject to minimum dollar limits.
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memorandum or prospectus is materially false or misleading, purchasers are
5
entitled to rescission or damages.

1

Because some foreign offerors have been unwilling to distribute their
securities in Canada if they would be subjected to contractual rights of action,
the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) has exempted certain foreign
issuers from this requirement. 5 2 The OSC has accepted arguments that there
was little need for a contractual right of action when the offerees were
sophisticated, the issuers were well-known and stable, and a prospectus-type
document was being distributed to the purchaser.
None of the three justifications for the waiver of contractual rights of
action is conceptually satisfactory. Sophistication of the offerees is not a
compelling justification because the prospectus exemptions require that the
recipients of offering memoranda be sophisticated, at least to the extent that
sophistication accompanies the ability to invest $150,000, regardless of
whether the memoranda contain contractual rights of action. The Canadian
investment dealers who applied for the orders did not undertake to limit
solicitations to a peculiarly sophisticated subset of private offerees. To the
extent the sophistication of the offerees suggests that there should be no
contractual right of action, the basic requirement that such a remedy be
available may be misguided. To the extent that exempting the orders was
based on the size and reputation of the issuers, the requirement that the
offering memorandum contain contractual rights of action may be too broad
in failing to distinguish senior from junior issuers. Finally, that the purchasers
receive a prospectus-type document should be irrelevant because, had the
purchasers received a statutory prospectus, they would have statutory rights
of action for rescission or damages for a misleading prospectus. The
predominant policy implicit in granting waivers from the requirement of
contractual rights of action seems to be the OSC's desire that Canadian
dealers and investors should be able to participate in multinational offerings.
In addition to liberalizing the rules governing original distribution, the
OSC has also made accommodations for related secondary distributions.
Under Canada's closed system, resales of securities (other than exempt
securities) distributed without a prospectus may be made only if a specific
statutory exemption is available or holding periods have been observed and
the issuer is a "reporting issuer," that is, an issuer subject to and in
compliance with continuous disclosure obligations aimed at the secondary
markets. 53 Because the Ontario Securities Act limits the great majority of
51. Regulations under the Ontario Securities Act, Regulation 910, ONr. REV. REG. § 21 (1980).
The civil liability consequences of a false prospectus are set out in Securities Act, 8 ONT. REV. STAT.
ch. 466, § 126 (1980).
52. Britoil, 8 ONT. SEC. COMMISSION BULL. 2944 (1985); Swiss Bank Corporation, 8 ONT. SEC.
COMMISSION BULL. 4507 (1985); Cable and Wireless, 9 ONT. SEC. COMMISSION BULL. 371 (1986); KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines, 9 ONT. SEC. COMMISSION BULL. 2280 (1986); AB Electrolux, 9 ONT. SEC.
COMMISSION BULL. 3387 (1986); NationalAustralia Bank Limited, 10 ONT. SEC. COMMISSION BULL. 2205
(1987); Philips N.V., 10 ONT. SEC. COMMISSION BULL. 3288 (1987).
53. Securities Act, 8 ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 466, §§ 71(4), (5), (7) (1980).
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transaction-based exemptions to sales by the issuer, for nonreporting issuers
the permissible scope of resales is effectively restricted to trades among
financial institutions. Conceptually, this is similar to Rule 144 under the 1933
Act, except that the Canadian rules are intended to be exhaustive rather than
54
safe harbor rules.

Early in 1986, the OSC effectively ruled that shares of Britoil plc
(previously distributed under an exemption from the contractual right of
action) could be resold freely notwithstanding that Britoil is not a reporting
issuer in Ontario. 55 The OSCjustified this exemption by noting that Britoil is
subject to fairly extensive continuous disclosure obligations by virtue of its
listing on the London Stock Exchange.
The absence of a permissive, Britoil-type resale ruling in a private
placement to the initial Canadian purchasers of securities of foreign nonreporting issuers acquired through a transactional prospectus exemption does
not necessarily preclude resale. 56 Where the securities have a liquid market
outside Canada, the Canadian purchaser could privately resell the securities
to a non-Canadian financial institution. That institution could then sell them,
for example, on the London Stock Exchange. Having no nexus with Ontario,
the sale on the London Stock Exchange would be beyond the reach of the
Ontario Securities Act. The securities might find their way back to Canada,
but so long as the original Canadian purchasers had not in effect orchestrated
their return, the securities would be completely and lawfully outside the
closed system upon their return.
As is apparent from the preceding discussion, the OSC has power to
exempt persons from the prospectus and other provisions of the Ontario
Securities Act on an ad hoc basis "where it is satisfied that to do so would not
be prejudicial to the public interest. ' '5 7 Even though the SEC no-action letter
may go some distance in the same direction, the breadth of the OSC's power
is markedly greater than the SEC's administrative powers. If the OSC
continues to be generally hospitable to multinational offerings, the breadth of
its exemptive power presents a real opportunity to issuers and underwriters.
V
CANADIAN ISSUERS IN THE

A.

U.S.

DOMESTIC MARKET

Canadian Law Presents Illusory Barriers

It should be observed initially that Canadian domestic ownership laws,
outside of certain specific industries such as banking and communications,
54.
55.

Cf 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1986).
Britoil, 9 ONT.SEC. COMMISSION BULL. 1887 (1986).

56. The author is not aware of other resale rulings comparable to Britoil, and it is doubtful,
however, that the Ontario Securities Commission regards itself bound by precedent to the same
degree as a court. Furthermore, the OSC is particularly sensitive to resales in Ontario of securities of
non-reporting issuers distributed without a prospectus. See Nim & Company, 9 ONT. SEC. COMMISSION
BULL. 2027 (1986).
57. Securities Act, 8 ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 466, § 73(1) (1980).
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and income tax laws are not barriers to Canadian participation in the
attractive U.S. securities market. Because of the relative sizes of the securities
markets, Canadian issuers are more likely to make trans-border equity
offerings in Europe and the United States than U.S. issuers would be to make
such offerings in Canada. The constraints imposed by Canadian domestic
ownership legislation are not burdensome to multinational equity offerings by
Canadian issuers. Under the Investment Canada Act, 58 the 1985 successor to
the much maligned Foreign Investment Review Act, the acquisition of control
of a Canadian business with assets of $5,000,000 or more by non-Canadians is
a reviewable transaction. 59 For purposes of the Investment Canada Act, an
entity is deemed to be Canadian controlled if Canadians own a majority of its
voting shares, unless it is established that the entity is in fact controlled by a
60
non-Canadian or by a voting group controlled by non-Canadians.
On the income tax side, the greatest difficulty for the issuer in having nonCanadian shareholders is the withholding tax on dividends or interest which,
by virtue of the Canada-United States Tax Convention, is not greater than
61
15% in the case of dividends or interest paid to U.S. residents.
Furthermore, interest paid on certain long-term obligations by a Canadian
corporation to a non-resident dealing at arm's length may be paid free of
62
withholding tax.

B.

The SEC's Proposed Approaches to Multinational Securities Offerings

The SEC's 1933 Act Release requested comment on the desirability of
facilitating multinational offerings by alternative approaches. The common
prospectus approach requires the "development of a common prospectus
which would be simultaneously filed with each of the country's respective
securities administrators.- 63 The reciprocal approach is an "agreement by
the three countries that a prospectus accepted in an issuer's domicile which
meets certain standards would be accepted for offerings in each of the
participating countries." 64 The jurisdictions contemplated by the 1933 Act
Release were the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
Many commentators have observed that, in theory, the common
prospectus is the better approach. Yet, most commentators also despair of
achieving agreement by all of the regulators and representatives of the
58. Ch. 20, 1985 Can. Stat. § 14.
59. Id. § 14(3). Where the acquisition of control occurs not directly by way of acquisition of the
assets or shares of the Canadian business but rather indirectly by way of acquisition of the shares of a

non-Canadian corporation, in most cases the transaction will not be reviewable unless the assets of
the entity carrying on the business in Canada have a value of at least $50,000,000. Id. §§ 14(1),
14(4), 28.
60. Id. § 26.
61. Income Tax Act, ch. 63, 1970-1972 Can. Stat. § 212(2), as amended; Tax Convention and
Proposed Protocols with Canada, art. 10, § 2, Sept. 26, 1980, reviewed in: Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, Tax Conventions and ProposedProtocals with Canada, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 22, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
1, 25 (1984).
62. Income Tax Act, ch. 63, 1970-1972 Can. Stat. § 212(l)(b)(vii), as amended.
63. 1933 Act Release, supra note 1, at 9281.
64. Id. at 9281.
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of a common prospectus.
the contents
concerning
regulatees
Notwithstanding these difficulties with the common prospectus approach, the
reciprocal approach may be found objectionable because it would tend to
undermine the prospectus system as applied by each jurisdiction to its
domestic issuers. 6 5 If reciprocity meant less detail in prospectuses for
multinational offerings, then what would be the justification for requiring
more detail in domestic offerings? One answer may be the size of the issuer.
The ABA Corporate Law Section's proposal for a reciprocal approach would
66
limit eligibility to "world class" issuers.
C.

Reciprocity Plus Supplementation

We are likely headed (if anywhere) toward the type of system suggested by
the ABA Corporate Law Section. This body recommends reciprocal
acceptance of a prospectus qualified in the issuer's home jurisdiction plus
supplementation in accordance with the domestic standards of each
matters and
participating jurisdiction in a few key areas, notably accounting
67
results.
operating
of
analysis
and
management's discussion
If multinational meant Canada and the United States, reconciliation of
prospectus requirements would be a non-issue. Prospectuses in the two
countries are virtually identical apart from differences in the management
discussion and analysis section, accounting principles, and the fact that in U.S.

prospectuses audited statements of income and changes in financial position
are required for only three years whereas in Canada they generally are
required to cover five years. 68 The management discussion in a U.S.
prospectus tends to be more detailed, although not necessarily more
informative, than in a Canadian prospectus. Many requirements of
Regulation S-K that are not specifically included in Canadian regulations are
nonetheless disclosed in Canadian prospectuses, simply as "other material
facts." 69 This similarity of prospectuses, as drafted, may be due in some
measure to the similarity in statutory standards of liability in the two
countries. Canadian securities lawyers are quite familiar with Bar Chris and its
teachings on the subject of due diligence. 70 While making an offering in the
United States entails for a Canadian issuer additional printing costs and fees
for lawyers and accountants, the burden of these increased costs would be far
from overwhelming, especially where the issuer and the issue are large.
65. Letter of submissions from Clarkson Gordon to the Securities and Exchange Commission
Concerning Multinational Securities Offerings 3 (July 10, 1985).
66. Letter of submissions from the American Bar Association, Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law, to the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Multinational Securities
Offerings 8 (July 15, 1985).
67. Id. at 6-8.
68. Compare SEC Regulation S-X, Rule 3-02(a), 17 C.F.R. 210.3-02(a) (1986) with Regulation
910, ONT. REV. REGS. § 4191(a) (1980).
69. SEC, Staff Survey of the Disclosure Requirements of the United States, the United Kingdom
and the Canadian Provinces of Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia (Feb. 1985) (available in the
office of Law and Contemporary Problems).
70. Escott v. Bar Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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The differences in generally accepted accounting principles as between the
United States and Canada are numerous. Depending on the financial
situation of the issuer, these differences can be highly material. For example,
in Canada, certain development costs can be capitalized that in the United
States must be expensed. Foreign currency gains and losses on long-term
debt must be recognized on an annual basis in the United States; in Canada,
they must be computed annually but the resulting gain or loss is amortized
over the remaining life of the debt. There are various differences in pension
plan accounting, including, for example, the recapturing of funds from an
over-funded pension plan. Canadian principles allow the entire amount to be
recognized as an extraordinary income item in the year of recapture. In
contrast, U.S. principles require that the income be recognized over a period
of not less than 10 years. Interest costs associated with long-term
construction and inventories must be capitalized in the United States and
must be expensed in Canada. The test for extraordinary items is, in certain
cases, more restrictive in the United States than in Canada. Canadian
accounting principles include preferred shares redeemable at the option of
the holder in shareholders' equity; they are excluded in the United States.
Finally, there are differences in the accounting treatment for shares issued
pursuant to employee stock option and stock purchase plans.
The OSC staff submission in response to the 1933 Act Release suggested
dispensing with the requirement of accounting reconciliation in multinational
prospectuses. 7 1 This proposal does not appear acceptable because it would
impede investors and analysts from meaningfully comparing financial
performance of a foreign issuer with that of a domestic issuer in the same
industry. Doubtless, the reconciliation requirements add substantial expense
to the auditors' fees incurred in a public offering and also burden the issuer
by requiring additional financial records to permit such reconciliation. Cost
savings, however, are not everything; reconciliation is a requirement that must
be preserved in the interest of comparability.
As others have noted, 7 2 a reciprocal prospectus system that would result in
disclosure in one jurisdiction but not in another is completely impracticable
because of the liabilities for failure to disclose imposed by section 11 of the
1933 Act and section 126 of the Ontario Securities Act. Faced with such
potential liabilities and the possibility that a matter disclosed in one
jurisdiction would be found material by a court in a jurisdiction where it was
not disclosed, a common prospectus containing the disclosures mandated by
the most demanding jurisdiction will prevail in multinational offerings. The
prospectus standards of both Canada and the United States require not
simply compliance with the items set out in the applicable form and
regulations but also that the document contain full, true, and plain disclosure
71. See OSC Response to 1933 Act Release, supra note 11, at 3987-88.
72. Letter of submissions by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York to the Securities
and Exchange Commission Concerning Multinational Securities Offerings 2 (May 21, 1985).
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of all material facts without omitting any facts necessary to prevent the
73
statements made from being misleading.
D.

Remaining Obstacles to Internationalization

Although the harmonization of prospectus contents is generally not much
of a problem for Canadian issuers, there are a number of real disincentives to
Canadians seeking to issue securities in the United States. It is unclear,
however, if solutions to any or all of these disincentives do or should exist.
These disincentives include differing standards for entitlement to use a short
form prospectus, differing continuous disclosure obligations, and differing
74
standards and procedures governing civil liability.
The short form prospectus offers advantages to the issuer in terms of its
cost of preparation and speed of clearance. In Canada, issuers which have
outstanding shares (not including preferred shares) with an aggregate market
value of at least $75,000,000 (Cdn.) held by non-insiders may use a short form
prospectus, incorporating continuous disclosure documents by reference. To
qualify for the use of a short form prospectus the issuer must: (1) file an
annual information form ("AIF"), which is a document similar to a Form 10K; (2) be a reporting issuer for a period of thirty-six months prior to filing the
AIF; and (3) not be in default of any of its obligations as a reporting issuer
when the preliminary short form prospectus is filed or when the receipt is
issued for the final prospectus. 7 5 Reporting issuers are, principally, those that
76
have filed a prospectus or have a class of securities listed on an exchange.
The principal obligations of reporting issuers are to provide annual and
quarterly financial statements, solicit proxies, and promptly disclose all
material changes in their affairs. 7 7 The timely disclosure obligation in section
74 of the Ontario Securities Act is actually more demanding than the Form 8K requirement under the 1934 Act; 78 the former covers all material changes
and not just a specified list and the report is required "as soon as practicable"
but in no event more than ten days after the date of the change.
The rules under the 1933 Act for use of the short form prospectus involve
a substantially higher size requirement (for equity offerings at least
$100,000,000 (U.S.) in market value of shares held by non-affiliates) 7 9 than
the Canadian rules. The U.S. short form prospectus incorporates by
73. Securities Act, 8 ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 466, §§ 1(1)24, 58(1) (1980); Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 11 (1982).
74. For a discussion of differing standards for entitlement to use a short form prospectus, see
infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text. For a discussion of differing continuous disclosure
obligations, see infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. For a discussion of differing civil liability
provisions, see infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
75. See OSC Policies § 5.6, 3 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
471-506 (1987).
76. Securities Act, 8 ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 466, § 1(1)38 (1980).
77. Id. at §§ 74, 76, 77, 84, 85.
78. Form 8-K is reprinted at 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
31,001 (July 1, 1985).
79. Instructions to Form S-3 under the 1933 Act. The form is reprinted at 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
7,152 (Apr. 22, 1983). If the annual trading volume is less than 3,000,000 shares, then the
market value figure rises to $150,000,000. For offerings of debt and preferred shares, in lieu of the
size requirement the critical factor is the rating of the security.
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reference either the Form 10-K or the Form 20-F, both of which require more
detail than the Canadian AIF. For most foreign private issuers, the
requirement relating to minimum market value of outstanding securities will
be $300,000,000 (U.S.) rather than $100,000,000 (U.S.). The lower figure
applies only to foreign private issuers who report to the SEC on Form 10-K,
and the higher figure applies to foreign private issuers who report on Form
20-F. 8 0

Several hundred Canadian issuers are qualified in terms of size and status
as a reporting issuer to use the Canadian short form prospectus and over one
hundred of these issuers are actually eligible to use it by virtue of having a
current AIF on file. However, only a handful of Canadian issuers would meet
the size requirement of Form F-3 under the 1933 Act. Therefore, with rare
exceptions 8 ' a Canadian issuer must forego the possibility of using a short
form prospectus if it wishes to qualify shares for sale in the United States.
Continuous disclosure obligations impose important disincentives on
Canadian issuers proposing multinational securities offerings in the United
States. Canadian issuers become subject to the full range of continuous
disclosure obligations under the 1934 Act when they file a registration
statement under the 1933 Act.8 2 Even if the issuer is already subject to certain
1934 Act reporting requirements (for example, by virtue of seeking a
NASDAQ quotation), because of a perverse compliment paid only to
Canadians among all foreign issuers, the issuer will no longer be able to use
the Form 20-F and will have to use the Form 10-K for annual reports. The
issuer will also lose the other advantages mentioned earlier in this article
which are associated with use of Form 20-F.8 3 This issuer will have to comply
with the normal rules under the 1934 Act relating to proxy solicitation,
quarterly reports, and reports of current changes on Form 8-K, and its
insiders will become subject to insider trading reporting pursuant to section
16(a) and recovery of short-swing profits under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act.
Apart from section 16(b), which is regarded simply as bizarre by Canadians
and by others outside the United States, these various continuous disclosure
obligations cover familiar territory. But the U.S. obligations are generally
more detailed, and therefore more burdensome to comply with, than their
Canadian counterparts. Canadian information circulars (proxy statements)
are not reviewed by the securities commissions; and interim reports to
shareholders generally consist of an unaudited income statement, a statement
of changes in financial position, and a reasonably short and non-specific cover
80. Compare Form S-3, Instruction I(A)(5), 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
7,152 (Apr. 22, 1983)
with Form F-3, Instruction I(A)(4), 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
6,971 (Dec. 4, 1982).
81. One exception is Alcan Aluminum Limited, which made its 1983 multinational offering
using a short form prospectus both in Canada and the United States.
82. This is the case because such an issuer will, by virtue of filing the 1933 Act registration
statement, become subject to section 15(d) of the 1934 Act and, thereby, ineligible to use Form 20-F.
See 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f (1986).
83. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
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the depth of detail
letter from the president. Generally, they do not go into
84
required, for example, by Item 303 of Regulation S-K.
Exposure to civil liability is perhaps the most fundamental decision facing
Canadian corporations which plan to issue securities or develop a secondary
market in the United States. There does not exist in Canada the broad
statutory and quasi-statutory rules of securities law civil liability (in regard to
secondary market transactions) found in the U.S. federal securities laws. Also,
the Canadian litigation culture is not as hospitable to plaintiffs as that of the
United States.
Ontario, Nova Scotia, Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia each have
civil liability provisions for misleading prospectuses closely modelled after
section 11 of the 1933 Act. 8 5 These four provinces also have liability
provisions relating to take-over bid circulars analogous to those for
prospectuses, 8 6 but they have neither express liability provisions similar to
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act nor implied liabilities similar to those deriving
from section 10(b) or 14(e) of the 1934 Act. 8 7 In 1984, the OSC published
draft amendments to the Ontario Securities Act that would impose upon
issuers civil liability for continuous disclosure
proposals have dropped from view.

documents, 88

but these

The extent to which liabilities under the U.S. federal securities laws are
broader than those flowing from the common law tort of deceit is debatable
(and beyond the scope of this article). Even after ten years of restrictive
United States Supreme Court interpretations of the reach of the anti-fraud
provisions, common law remedies are probably less available than implied
statutory remedies only because at least a semblance of privity is required for
the former. Whether as cause or effect, Canadian rules on contingent fees,
costs, and class actions reflect the relative non-litigiousness of Canadians as
compared with Americans. In Ontario, contingent and percentage based fees
in litigation are unlawful.8 9 The losing party in litigation is usually ordered to
pay the winning parties' costs, including counsel fees. However, counsel fees
are awarded according to a schedule which does not place upon the losing
party the entire burden for the winning party's fees unless the losing party's
position was particularly baseless. Finally, in practice, damage claims may not
84. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1986). This is the item entitled "Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations."
85. See Securities Act, 8 ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 466 § 126 (1980); Securities Act, ch. 11, 1984, N.S.
Stat. § 117; Securities Act, ch. 48, 1982 Que. Stat. §§ 217-220; Securities Act, ch. 5-6.1, 1981; Alta.
Stat. § 168; Securities Act, ch. 42, 1987. B.C. Stat. § 114. An important difference, however, is that
the Canadian provisions appear to place upon the plaintiff the burden of proving a defendant's lack
of due diligence. Placing this burden on the plaintiff seems an odd policy choice because the
defendant is more likely to be in possession of the facts relating to diligence.
86. Securities Act, 8 ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 466, § 127 (1980); Securities Act, ch. 48, 1982; Que.
Stat. §§ 223-225.1; Securities Act, ch. S-6.1, 1981; Alta. Stat. § 169; Securities Act, ch. 42, 1987; B.C.
Stat. § 115.
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), n(e) (1982).
88.

ONT. SEC. COMMISSION BULL. 4909 (1984).

89. Solicitors Act, 8 ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 478, § 30 (1980). The prohibition on contingent fees in
litigation is not universal in Canada. Manitoba, for example, permits such fee arrangements.
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be prosecuted in Canada by way of class action. 90 The preceding catalogue
simply suggests that the real disincentive to a Canadian issuer in making a
multinational securities offering in the United States is not the difficulties in
prospectus qualification but rather a hesitancy to undertake the burdens of
SEC-style continuous disclosure and the perceived risk of enormous civil
liabilities.
The possible application of Canadian "blocking legislation" to the
enforcement of U.S. securities laws against Canadian entities has caused some
concern in the United States.9 1 Under the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures
Act (the "FEMA"), 9 2 production of information requested by a foreign
tribunal may be prohibited when the Attorney General of Canada determines
that production is likely to affect adversely significant Canadian interests in
relation to international trade or commerce or is otherwise likely to infringe
Canadian sovereignty. The FEMA was enacted in response to extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws and the Trading With the Enemy Act, 93 both
areas of substantive law where the Canadian policy is quite different from U.S.
antitrust and national security laws and policies. Nevertheless, because
Canadian and U.S. securities law enforcement policies are very similar, it is
unlikely that the Canadian Attorney General would invoke the FEMA,
especially where the subject matter involves a Canadian company that had
deliberately chosen to participate in the U.S. securities market. Canadian
blocking legislation in the securities law enforcement context appears to pose
no real problem.
VI
CONCLUSION

Although the SEC's release on multinational securities offerings has
proved thought provoking and has generated much paper, from a Canadian
perspective it appears to fall somewhat wide of the mark. While a common
prospectus or a reciprocal prospectus approach to multinational offerings, if
developed, might facilitate or increase the frequency of multinational
offerings, Canada is unlikely to soon become a major market for nonCanadian securities.
On the export side, Canadian issuers do not experience major difficulties
in complying with U.S. prospectus rules, apart possibly from the accounting
90. The difficulty is that, while most of the provinces have in their rules of civil procedure
provisions authorizing class actions, they require that class members have "the same interest" in the
subject matter of the litigation and the courts have held the requisite sameness to be lacking where

the claims for damages (assuming that the class is the plaintiff) all depend upon the claimant's
individual transactions with the defendant. See General Motors of Can., Ltd. v. Naken (1983) 1
S.C.R. 72, 79-80.
91. See the exchange of correspondence between the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Ontario Securities Commission regarding a trading link between the American Stock Exchange,
and the Toronto Stock Exchange, published in 8 ONT. SEC. COMMISSION BULL. 4879 (1985).
92. Ch. 49, 1984 Can. Stat. § 3. See also Business Records Protection Act, I ONT. REV. STAT. ch.
56 (1980).
93. 50 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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area. Absent the development of a generally accepted set of accounting
standards on a supra-national basis, it is hard to see how that difficulty could
be ameliorated. Many Canadian issuers have caused their shares to be listed
on U.S. securities exchanges or to be quoted on the NASDAQ system. After
taking such steps, issuers may be compelled as a practical matter to qualify
further public distributions of the listed or quoted class of securities for sale
in the United States unless they can devise satisfactory procedures to make
sure that the newly issued securities do not find their way into the hands of
U.S. purchasers during or within a short time following the distribution.
Canadian issuers are also active in the Euromarket, but disclosure standards
in that market are, if anything, less demanding than in North America.
While internationalization may be upon us, it is doubtful that its
development has been influenced much by different standards of prospectus
disclosure or would be influenced much by the development of more uniform
standards. A more pressing concern for Canada may be the danger to the
depth and liquidity of the Canadian securities markets resulting from the
development outside the country, especially in London, of major trading
markets for Canadian securities.

